Millions of people in the Middle East dream of a safe and quiet life,
free of drama and violent death. The past year of a war worse than any other in the region in modern times has once again shown that dreams of peace cannot be realized unless deep political, strategic and religious gaps are bridged. Once again, war is transforming the politics of the Middle East. The Hamas attack came as a result of a conflict that has remained unresolved for more than a century. For Israelis, it was the worst day in their history, as Hamas broke through their barely secured borders. About 1,200 people were killed, mostly Israeli civilians. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called President Joe Biden and said, "I have never seen such atrocities in the history of the nation," not "since the Holocaust." Israel viewed the Hamas attack as a threat to its existence. Since then, Israel has inflicted many miserable days on the Palestinians in Gaza. The Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health announced that about 42,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Most of Gaza is in ruins. Palestinians accuse Israel of genocide. The war has expanded. Twelve months after Hamas' attacks began, the Middle East is on the brink of an even worse war: wider, deeper and more destructive.
Death of an illusion The year of killings has stripped away layers of assumptions and illusions. One of them is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's belief that the Palestinian problem can be resolved without making concessions to Palestinian demands for self-determination. Also gone is the wishful thinking that had reassured Israel's anxious Western allies. Politicians in the United States, Britain and elsewhere were convinced that Netanyahu could somehow be persuaded to accept such a state to end the war, despite his lifelong opposition to a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Netanyahu's refusal reflected the near-universal distrust of Palestinians inside Israel, as well as Netanyahu's own ideology. It also undermined America's ambitious peace plan. President Biden's "Big Deal" stipulated that Israel would receive full diplomatic recognition from Saudi Arabia, the most influential Islamic state, in exchange for Palestinian independence. The Saudis would in return enter into a security pact with the United States. The Biden plan failed at the first hurdle. Prime Minister Netanyahu said in February that statehood would be a "huge reward" for Hamas. Bezalel Smotrich, one of the cabinet's ultranationalist extremists, said this would be an "existential threat" to Israel. Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader believed to still be alive somewhere in Gaza, had his own illusions. A year ago, he must have hoped that Iran's remaining so-called "axis of resistance" would launch an all-out war to annihilate Israel. He was wrong. Sinwar kept his plans to attack Israel on October 7 so secret that it surprised his enemies. He also surprised some on his own side. Diplomatic sources told the BBC that Sinwar may not have even shared his plans with his organization's political leaders in exile in Qatar. They were speaking on open lines that are notoriously lax in security protocols and could easily be eavesdropped on, the people said. When Israel invaded Gaza and President Biden ordered a US aircraft carrier battle group to approach to defend Israel, Iran made it clear that it did not want a major war, let alone go on the offensive. Instead, Hassan Nasrallah and his friend and ally, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, limited themselves to rocket fire on Israel's northern border and said they would continue until a ceasefire in Gaza. While the attacks were primarily military in nature, Israel evacuated more than 60,000 people from its borders, and in Lebanon, perhaps twice as many people were displaced within a few months as Israel counterattacked.
Israel made it clear that it would not tolerate an endless war of attrition with Hezbollah. Nevertheless, it was widely believed that Israel would be deterred by Hezbollah's impressive combat record in past wars and its Iranian-supplied missile arsenal. In September, Israel launched an offensive. No one, except the top brass of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Mossad intelligence agency, believed it could inflict so much damage so quickly on Iran's most powerful ally. The Israelis detonated remote-controlled pagers and radios, disrupting Hezbollah's communications and killing its leaders. She launched one of the most intense bombardments of modern warfare. On the first day, Israel killed about 600 Lebanese, many of them civilians. The attack deeply shook Iran's belief that its network of allies was strengthening its strategy to deter and intimidate Israel. The decisive moment came on September 27, with a massive airstrike on the southern outskirts of Beirut, killing Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and many of his key subordinates. Nasrallah was an important part of Iran's "axis of resistance," an informal alliance and defense network of allies and proxies. Israel broke the border war by escalating it into a larger one. If the strategic intent was to force Hezbollah to ceasefire and withdraw from the border, it failed. Attacks and invasions of southern Lebanon did not deter Iran. Iran appears to have concluded that its open reluctance to risk a major war emboldened Israel to take even tougher action. A counterattack would be risky and an Israeli response would be certain, but for the Supreme Leader and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard it became the least bad option. On Tuesday, October 1, Iran attacked Israel with a ballistic missile. ___ Trauma Heaven
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